Is Money A Primary Or Secondary Reinforcer

• Journal List
• Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci
• v.1(3); 2006 December
• PMC1807267

Soc Cogn Touch on Neurosci. 2006 Dec; 1(3): 250–259.

Fear of losing money? Aversive workout with secondary reinforcers

Yard. R. Delgado

¹Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, Newark NJ 07102, ²Department of Psychology, and ³Centre for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA

C. D. Labouliere

¹Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, Newark NJ 07102, ⁱⁱDepartment of Psychology, and ³Center for Neural Scientific discipline, New York University, New York, NY 10003, The states

East. A. Phelps

¹Department of Psychology, Rutgers Academy, Newark NJ 07102, ²Section of Psychology, and ⁱⁱⁱCenter for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY 10003, The states

Received 2006 Aug xv; Accustomed 2006 Sep 17.

Abstract

Money is a secondary reinforcer that acquires its value through social advice and interaction. In everyday homo behavior and laboratory studies, money has been shown to influence appetitive or advantage learning. It is unclear, even so, if money has a similar touch on on aversive learning. The goal of this study was to investigate the efficacy of money in aversive learning, comparing information technology with primary reinforcers that are traditionally used in fright conditioning paradigms. A series of experiments were conducted in which participants initially played a gambling game that led to a budgetary gain. They were then presented with an aversive conditioning epitome, with either stupor (main reinforcer) or loss of money (secondary reinforcer) equally the unconditioned stimulus. Pare conductance responses and subjective ratings indicated that potential monetary loss modulated the conditioned response. Depending on the presentation context, the secondary reinforcer was as effective every bit the primary reinforcer during aversive workout. These results suggest that stimuli that acquire reinforcing properties through social communication and interaction, such every bit money, tin effectively influence aversive learning.

Keywords: reward, penalty, striatum, amygdala, incentive, valence, main reinforcer, fear conditioning, Pavlovian workout, neuroeconomics

INTRODUCTION

Research focused on understanding the mechanisms of affective learning have led to the development of elegant animal models that can exist translated to humans. Yet, such models are limited in reflecting everyday human part in a social and cultural context. For instance, animal studies have traditionally utilized inherently appetitive or aversive stimuli to attune learning. In human culture, however, the more than common reinforcers that influence behavior are socially defined. One case is money, a reinforcer that acquires value through social communication and interaction. Although some enquiry exists to testify the modulatory influence of money every bit a advantage on the behavioral and neural correlates of appetitive learning, less is known virtually the effectiveness of money during aversive conditioning, where main reinforcers such as shock are traditionally used. The goal of this study is to first investigate the efficacy of money, a secondary reinforcer, in aversive conditioning; and second, to compare the influence of primary and secondary reinforcers on aversive conditioning.

Early on theories of appetitive conditioning identified two different categories of reinforcers, primary and secondary reinforcers, that are capable of influencing motivational behavior (Skinner, 1938; Hull, 1943). For instance, hunger was defined as a primary drive, an innate or biologically preprogrammed state which elicits nutrient seeking behavior and food consumption, in consequence, labeling food as a primary reinforcer. Studies of appetitive conditioning in animals accept demonstrated the result of chief reinforcers such as nutrient, liquid or odors on beliefs (Pavlov and Anrep, 1927; Skinner, 1953; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) and its associated neural mechanisms (Parkinson et al., 2000; Everitt et al. 2003; Cardinal and Everitt, 2004). Similarly in humans, primary reinforcers can influence behavior and act through common neural structures to induce appetitive conditioning (Breiter et al., 1997; Gottfried et al., 2002; O'Doherty et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2003).

In contrast, a secondary drive was defined as a learned or acquired country. Money, as previously mentioned, is an case of a secondary reinforcer, which acquires its reinforcing backdrop through its association with primary reinforcers (i.e. money tin can be used to acquire nutrient). Due to societal and cultural factors, money has evolved to become a powerful incentive in driving homo behavior, mayhap equally every bit of import as primary reinforcers. In the laboratory, this has been primarily observed during appetitive learning, where secondary reinforcers such equally coin lead to successful behavioral learning of contingencies, further eliciting activation in similar neural structures as primary reinforcers (Breiter and Rosen, 1999; Delgado et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001a, b; Delgado et al., 2003, 2005).

Less is known about the role of coin equally a secondary reinforcer in aversive classical workout. Typically in a fear conditioning session, for case, an aversive chief reinforcer, such as mild shock or puff of air in the centre is used as the unconditioned stimulus (Us). Studies using mild shocks as reinforcers take found robust conditioned responses expressed through measures such as freezing, for instance, in rats (Davis, 1992; LeDoux, 2000; Pare, et al., 2004) and skin conductance responses in humans (Adolphs et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1998; Phelps et al., 2004). However, it is unclear how constructive secondary reinforcers such as coin tin be during aversive classical conditioning, and how such reinforcers compare with aversive primary reinforcers.

The electric current report aims to investigate the efficacy of money as an unconditioned stimulus in an aversive conditioning paradigm, comparing its efficacy with a chief reinforcer. Specifically, two questions are asked: (one) can loss of money serve as an aversive unconditioned stimulus during a classical workout paradigm; and (ii) how does it compare to a primary reinforcer, namely shock, at inducing conditioned fearfulness? Three experiments were designed to investigate these issues (Figure 1). The start experiment probes the effectiveness of loss of money as an unconditioned stimulus in a elementary aversive or fear conditioning paradigm. In the second experiment, principal and secondary reinforcers within the aforementioned conditioning session are contrasted. Finally, the third experiment compares the efficacy of loss of money and daze equally unconditioned stimuli when the presentation context is manipulated and separate fearfulness workout sessions are used.

Experimental breakup—question and goals of each of the experiments, forth with type of unconditioned stimulus (Us) used in aversive workout sessions. Experiments I and Ii involved one conditioning session each, while Experiment 3 independent two separate aversive conditioning sessions.

EXPERIMENT I

METHOD

Participants

Twenty-2 volunteers participated in this study (7 males, and 15 females). 2 participants were removed due to technical issues with the physiological recording equipment and failure to comply with instructions. Final assay was therefore conducted on 20 participants (6 males, and 14 females). Participants responded to posted advertisement (average age: K = 19.85, s.d. = one.79), and all participants gave informed consent.

Procedure

Participants were instructed that the experiment consisted of two parts (Figure 2). The commencement part was a gambling session (adjusted from Delgado et al., 2004). In this session, participants were told they were playing a computerized 'card-guessing' game, where the objective was to determine if the value of a given carte du jour was higher or lower than the number 5 (Figure 2A). During each trial, a question mark was presented in the eye of the 'card' (a white rectangle projected in a black screen), indicating that participants had 3.5 s to make a response. Participants could chose either higher (possible outcomes: six, 7, 8 and ix) or lower (possible outcomes: 1, 2, 3 and 4) than 5 past using their correct hand'southward index and middle finger, respectively, and pressing the respective push button in the keyboard. The outcome was and so displayed for 500 ms, followed by a feedback arrow (which indicated positive or negative feedback) for another 500 ms and an inter-trial interval of iv.5 s earlier the onset of the next trial.

(A) The gambling chore—adapted from Delgado et al. (2004). Participants were presented with a card and were asked if its value was higher or lower than the number 5 and were given feedback on their choice. The question mark was the cue for participants to make their choice (either high or low). During a subsequent effect phase, participants were presented with the actual value of the card and either positive or negative feedback depending on their choice. (B) Aversive conditioning image with money as an unconditioned stimulus—adapted from Phelps et al. (2004). Participants viewed two squares of different colors (blue, yellowish) which served equally the conditioned stimuli (CS). One of the squares (CS+) was paired with occasional presentations of a visual display indicating a monetary loss of $two.00, the unconditioned stimulus.

Participants were told they would be playing trials of the game during alternate blocks chosen 'coin' and 'no money' blocks. During 'money' blocks, or high incentive trials, a green feedback arrow pointing up indicated a correct response and a monetary advantage of $4.00, while a scarlet feedback arrow pointing down indicated an incorrect response and a monetary loss of −$2.00. In contrast, during 'no money' blocks or low incentive trials, no monetary incentive was available, simply feedback equally a blue feedback arrow pointing up indicated a correct response while a blue feedback pointer pointing down indicated an incorrect response. Participants played iii blocks of loftier incentive trials (12 per cake) intermixed with three blocks of low incentive trials (12 per block) for a total of half dozen counterbalanced blocks of trials. Unbeknownst to participants, the outcomes were predetermined ensuring a 50% reinforcement rate and a total budgetary gain of $36.00 at the end of the kickoff part. This profit was an endowment which could be drawn upon in the fear conditioning session.

Each participant was informed of their total upon completion of the gambling session. The 2nd part of the experiment consisted of a fear workout session (adapted from Phelps et al., 2004). During this session, participants viewed repeated presentations of blue and yellow squares projected on a white screen (Figure 2B). The squares served as conditioned stimuli (CS) and were presented for 4 s, followed by a 12 s inter-trial interval. The unconditioned stimulus (US) was loss of money, depicted past the symbol −$two.00 written in red font and projected within the square for 500 ms co-terminating with the presentation of the CS. For each fear conditioning session, one colored square was paired with the monetary loss (CS+), while another colored foursquare was never paired with the US (CS−) in a fractional reinforcement design. There were 24 presentations of the CS− and 32 presentations of the CS+, eight of which were paired with the Usa. Participants were instructed to spotter the screen and the presentation of unlike colored squares. They were besides told that there was a possibility they would see a −$2.00 sign, and that if it appeared, that sum would be extracted from their $36.00 total. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and paid $twenty.00 in compensation.

Physiological set-upwardly, assessment & behavioral assay

Pare conductance responses (SCR) were caused from the participant's eye phalanges of the 2d and tertiary fingers in the left manus using BIOPAC systems skin conductance module. Shielded Ag–AgCl electrodes were grounded through an RF filter console and served to larn data. AcqKnowledge software was used to analyze SCR waveforms. The level of SCR response was assessed every bit the base to peak difference for an increase in the 0.v–4.5 s window post-obit the onset of a CS, the blue or yellow square (LaBar et al., 1995). A minimum response criterion of 0.02 μS was used with all other responses scored as 0. Responses were foursquare-root transformed prior to statistical analysis to reduce skewness (LaBar et al. 1998). Caused SCRs for each participant were then averaged per participant, per type of trial.

During the outset office of the experiment, the gambling session, physiological responses were acquired throughout the task. Based on assay and results from Delgado et al. (2004), where behavioral and imaging information suggested that participants were more engaged in the task during periods of high incentive than periods of low incentive, SCRs acquired at the onset of the trial (initial question mark) were analyzed. Two-tailed paired t-tests were used to compare activity at the onset of high incentive vs depression incentive trials to make up one's mind the levels of arousal elicited by the gambling session (when an opportunity to earn money was presented). During the second role of the experiment, the fright conditioning session, physiological responses were also acquired throughout the task. Based on analysis and results from Phelps et al. (2004), SCRs caused at the onset of CS presentations were analyzed. 2-tailed paired t-tests were used to compare activity of CS+ vs CS- trials. Finally, to further assess the efficacy of money during conditioning, a ii-tailed correlation betwixt the levels of arousal during gambling (the deviation between high and low incentive trials) and the levels of conditioning (the difference between CS+ and CS− trials) was conducted.

Results and Discussion

During the gambling session, participants showed higher SCRs during high incentive trials when compared to low incentive trials [t(nineteen) = three.4, P < 0.003] suggesting they were more engaged during task operation when the incentive was monetary (Figure iiiA). This result is consistent with and further supports a previous neuroimaging report (Delgado et al., 2004) that found behavioral and neural differences while participants played a gambling game that varied in the motivational context (i.east. high × low incentive trials).

Experiment I results. (A) Skin conductance responses (SCRs) obtained during the gambling session. Participants showed higher SCRs during periods of high incentive every bit compared to periods of depression incentive. (B) SCRs obtained during the aversive or fear workout session. Error confined represent standard error.

During the fear workout session, loss of money (−$ii.00) was successful in inducing conditioning, as SCRs were college for CS+ compared to CS− trials [t(19) = 3.09, P < 0.006; Figure 3B]. Interestingly, a correlation between the levels of conditioning (CS+ - CS− trials) and levels of arousal during gambling (loftier – low incentive trials) yielded a trend [r(18) = 0.43, P < 0.06], suggesting that the more angry participants were to winning coin during the gambling session, the more they 'feared' losing the money during the aversive conditioning session.

These results mirror previous studies of acquisition of conditioned fear in humans where the association of a neutral stimulus with an aversive upshot (i.east. a mild daze) leads to increased SCRs to the presentation of the previously neutral stimulus (Adolphs et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1995, 1998; Phelps et al., 2004). More interestingly, this experiment suggests that money, a secondary reinforcer, can be used during both appetitive and aversive workout. Information technology is possible, however, that a secondary reinforcer is only effective in the absence of a potentially more salient principal reinforcer. A 2nd experiment investigated the efficacy of a secondary reinforcer, such as money, as an unconditioned stimulus during aversive conditioning when compared with a primary reinforcer, such equally daze.

EXPERIMENT Two

METHOD

Participants

Xxx-iii volunteers participated in this written report (xvi males, and 17 females). Two participants were removed due to technical issues with the SCR equipment and failure to comply with instructions. Last analysis was conducted on 31 participants (15 males, and 16 females). Three of these participants did not fully complete their post-questionnaires, thus self-ratings information for the remaining 28 participants are included in analysis. Participants responded to posted advertisement (average age: M = 21.26, s.d. = 3.54), and all participants gave informed consent.

Procedure

Participants were instructed that the experiment consisted of two parts. The first part consisted of a gambling session and was identical to that described the offset part of Experiment I (Figure 2A). Upon completion of the gambling session, each participant was informed of their full ($36.00) and that they were about to start the second role of the experiment, which consisted of a fear conditioning session. During the session, participants viewed repeated presentations of bluish, yellowish and red squares projected on a white screen (Figure 4). The squares served equally CS and were presented for 6 s, followed past a ten southward inter-trial interval. There were two types of US: (1) loss of money (−$2.00), lasting 750 ms and co-terminating with the CS; and (2) balmy shock to the wrist, lasting 250 ms and co-terminating with the CS. For each fear conditioning session, ane colored square was paired with the monetary loss (CS+), while another colored square was paired with the aversive shock (CS++) and a remaining square was never paired with any U.s. (CS−) in a partial reinforcement setting.

Aversive conditioning process for Experiment II. CS+ trials predicted potential monetary loss, CS++ trials predicted a potential shock, and CS- trials were the baseline.

In that location were 26 presentations of the CS− and 35 presentations of the CS+ and CS++ each, with 8 of these trials being paired with their respective U.s.. Participants were instructed to watch the screen and the presentation of different colored squares. They were besides told that there was a possibility they would see a −$2.00 sign and that if it appeared, that sum would be extracted from their $36.00 total, and that in some instances they might receive a daze. At the stop of the experiment, participants filled out a mail-experiment questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate each square on a calibration from 1 to seven in terms of intensity and valence. They were then debriefed and paid $20.00 in bounty.

Physiological set-up, cess and behavioral assay

Skin conductance response (SCR) was acquired and analyzed as described in Experiment I. In addition, a Grass Instruments stimulator was used to administer mild shocks to participants during the second part. The stimulator was shielded for magnetic interference and grounded through an RF filter. A bar electrode attached to the right wrist delivered the shocks. Prior to experimental session, participants received a mild shock (200 ms elapsing, fifty pulses/due south) which was gradually increased according to the participant'due south self business relationship. They were instructed to gear up their own level where the stupor would feel 'uncomfortable, merely not painful' (maximum = fifty volts).

Analysis for the gambling session was identical every bit Experiment I, where two-tailed paired t-tests were used to compare action at the onset of high incentive vs low incentive trials. For the fear conditioning session, physiological responses acquired at the onset of CS presentations were analyzed. Three two-tailed paired t-tests were used to compare activity of CS++ vs CS−, CS+ vs CS− and CS++ vs CS+ trials. Similar analyses were conducted using the self-study data (both for intensity and valence) acquired through the postal service-experiment questionnaire. Finally, correlations between the levels of conditioning (CS+ vs CS- trials) caused during the fearfulness workout session and levels of arousal during gambling (loftier vs low incentive trials) were investigated, and besides correlated with the subjective ratings data to farther probe the efficacy of money, a secondary reinforcer, in driving aversive conditioning.

Results and Discussion

As expected, a replication of results was observed during the gambling session. Similar to Experiment I, participants showed higher SCRs during high incentive trials when compared to low incentive trials [t(thirty) = 5.36, P < 0.0001] suggesting they were more engaged during job performance when the incentive was monetary. After attaining $36.00 from the gambling session, participants were subjected to the fearfulness conditioning session. A master effect of type of CS (CS+ vs CS−) was supported by a one-way ANOVA [F(ii, 91) = 9.59, P < 0.003]. Additionally, mail hoc t-tests suggested that both primary (shock) and secondary (money) reinforcers were successful in inducing workout (Figure 5A), as SCRs were college for both CS++ [t(30) = half dozen.25, P < 0.0001] and CS+ [t(xxx) = three.78, P < 0.007] when compared with CS− trials, respectively. Despite both reinforcers leading to workout, at that place was a significant difference betwixt shock and money in the role of an effective US, as CS++ trials led to significantly higher SCRs than CS+ trials [t(30) = 5.85, P < 0.0001].

Experiment II results. (A) SCRs obtained during aversive conditioning session. (B) Self-rating of intensity. Mistake bars represent standard error.

At the cease of the experiment participants also rated each blazon of CS based on intensity and valence (Figure fiveB). Participants rated CS++, or shock trials, (intensity: Chiliad = 5.36, due south.d. = 1.03; valence: K = 4.96, south.d. = 1.75) higher than CS- trials (intensity: Thousand = one.64, s.d. = 1.16; valence: Thou = two.54, southward.d. = two.05) for both intensity [t(27) = 11.30, P < 0.0001] and valence [t(27) = 4.23, P < 0.0002]. Similarly, they rated CS+, or money trials, (intensity: M = 4.64, southward.d. = i.66; valence: M = 5.04, s.d. = 2.27) higher than CS− trials for both intensity [t(27) = vii.24, P < 0.0001] and valence [t(27) = 3.62, P < 0.001]. Interestingly, participants did not charge per unit CS++ and CS+ trials differently from each other for both intensity [t(27) = 1.63, P = 0.12] and valence [t(27) = −0.xiii, P = 0.9].

A correlation between the levels of conditioning (CS+ or CS++ trials − CS− trials) and levels of arousal during gambling (high − low incentive trials) was observed for both money [r(28) = 0.42, P < 0.05] and daze trials [r(28) = 0.36, P < 0.05]. Interestingly, participants who showed the greatest index of arousal during gambling (every bit measured past differential SCR) too rated the CS+ or coin trials every bit more intense [r(28) = 0.39, P < 0.05], but not the shock or CS++ trials [r(28) = −0.xiv, P = 0.49] or the CS− trials [r(28) = −0.11, P = 0.59]. Furthermore, participants who showed the greatest levels of conditioning with a secondary reinforcer as well rated coin trials as more intense [r(28) = 0.44, P < 0.05] and of college valence [r(28) = 0.46, P < 0.05].

The results of Experiment II support the proposition that a secondary reinforcer such as money can be an effective unconditioned stimulus during an aversive conditioning image, although perhaps not as effective equally a principal reinforcer such as shock, which elicited a higher conditioned response (as measured past SCR). Interestingly, participant's subjective ratings of intensity and valence of both types of CSs presented during the fear conditioning session did not differ. This is peculiar because of the obvious disagreement between participant's physiological and explicit expressions of feelings regarding the two CSs. Information technology is possible that because both money and shock were presented during the aforementioned session, presentation context modulated the strength of the physiological conditioning (CS–Usa contingency). To examine this possibility, Experiment Iii was designed to exam the same participants in ii split up sessions of aversive workout, one with primary The states and some other with secondary US, each with its own neutral baseline (CS-) to facilitate comparing across the two conditions.

EXPERIMENT III

METHOD

Participants

Twenty-six volunteers participated in this study (13 males and 13 females). Ii participants were removed due to technical issues with the SCR equipment. Concluding analysis was conducted on 24 participants (12 males, 12 females). Participants responded to posted advert (average historic period: Thou = 21.46, s.d. = 3.40), and all participants gave informed consent.

Procedure

Participants were instructed that the experiment consisted of three parts. The outset role consisted of a gambling session and was identical to that described in Experiment I (Figure 2a). Upon completion of the gambling session, each participant was informed of their total ($36.00) and that they were about to offset the side by side two parts of the experiment (Figure 6). Both the 2nd and third part of the experiment were separate fear conditioning sessions. During both sessions, participants viewed repeated presentations of ii colored squares (e.g. blue and yellow for i session, purple and grey for the other session) projected on a white screen. The squares served as CSs and one of the squares was paired with a U.s.a. (CS+), while some other square was not (CS−). The main divergence between the two fear conditioning sessions was that the type of US was different across sessions. For 1 of the sessions, a principal reinforcer such as an aversive shock, served as the The states, while in the other session, a secondary reinforcer, such as loss of coin (−$2.00), served as the US in a partial reinforcement design.

Aversive conditioning procedure Experiment III. Ii dissever conditioning sessions followed the gambling task. In the outset session, a master reinforcer (i.e. shock) was used every bit a The states. In the second session, a secondary reinforcer (i.east. loss of coin) was used as a US. Both sessions contained a CS- baseline.

For each conditioning session, at that place were 12 presentations of the CS− and 20 presentations of the CS+ each, with eight of these trials being paired with either a primary or secondary US (dependent upon session). Equally in Experiment II, the CS presentation was 6 s, followed past a 10 due south inter-trial interval. The monetary US was 750 ms and the stupor Us lasted 250 ms, both co-terminating with the CS. The color of the squares and the lodge in which the two conditioning sessions were administered were counterbalanced across subjects. Participants were instructed to lookout the screen and the presentation of different colored squares. For one fright workout session (primary reinforcer), they were told that they may or may non receive a shock during the session, only that they would non lose money. For the other fear workout session (secondary reinforcer), participants were told that in that location was a possibility they would meet a −$2.00 sign and that if so, that sum would be extracted from their $36.00 total, but that they would non receive a daze during that session. At the end of the experiment, participants filled out a mail service-experiment questionnaire. Participants were asked to charge per unit each square on a calibration from i to 7 in terms of intensity and valence. They were and so debriefed and paid $xx.00 in compensation.

Physiological gear up-upward, cess and behavioral analysis

Pare conductance response (SCR) was acquired during all experimental parts (gambling and both fear conditioning sessions). Mild shocks were administered during 1 of the fear conditioning sessions every bit described in Experiment II. Cess of SCRs was conducted every bit previously described.

Assay for the gambling session, was identical as Experiment I, where two-tailed paired t-tests were used to compare activity at the onset of high incentive vs low incentive trials. For the fear conditioning sessions, physiological responses acquired at the onset of CS presentations were analyzed. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with type of CS (CS+ and CS−) and type of reinforcer (master and secondary) as within-subjects cistron to investigate the furnishings of main and secondary reinforcers on conditioned fear. Similar analyses were conducted using the self-report data (both for intensity and valence) caused through the mail-experiment questionnaire.

Results and Give-and-take

A replication of results was once again observed during the showtime part of the experiment, the gambling session. Like to the previous two experiments, participants showed college SCRs during loftier incentive trials when compared to depression incentive trials [t(23) = 4.22, P < 0.0003] suggesting they were more than engaged during task functioning when the incentive was budgetary. After attaining $36.00 from the gambling session, participants were subjected to the second role (i.e. a fear workout session where the US was daze), followed by the third function (i.due east. a fright conditioning session where the The states was loss of money), with counterbalanced orders. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of type of CS [CS+ and CS−: F(i, 23) = 19.54, P < 0.0002], suggesting that conditioning was successful irrespective of session, and a master effect of type of reinforcer (master and secondary: F(1, 23) = 6.41, P < 0.02), suggesting that overall SCRs were college during the fright conditioning session with a primary Us (Effigy 7A). Nonetheless, no interaction betwixt type of CS and reinforcer was observed [F(1, 23) = i.58, P = 0.22], suggesting that a secondary reinforcer (i.e. money) tin be equally constructive equally a main reinforcer (i.e. shock) in driving aversive conditioning when presented in the appropriate context.

Experiment 3 Results. (A) SCRs obtained during both aversive workout sessions. (B) Self-rating of intensity. Mistake confined represent standard error.

As in Experiment Ii, participants also rated each type of CS based on intensity and valence at the end (Figure 7B). For example, during the fright conditioning session with stupor equally a US, participants rated both CS+, (intensity: One thousand = 5.13, s.d. = 1.96; valence: G = five.08, due south.d. = one.64) and CS− trials (intensity: M = 3.29, s.d. = 2.14; valence: G = two.v, s.d. = ane.89). Similarly, during the fright workout session with money every bit an Usa, they rated both CS+ (intensity: M = five.08, south.d. = ane.18; valence: Chiliad = 4.83, s.d. = 2.16) and CS− trials (intensity: Thousand = 2.58, south.d. = 1.67; valence: Grand = 2.92, s.d. = 2.04). To investigate differences between subjective ratings for the separate conditioning sessions, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. In accordance with the SCR measures, a principal upshot of type of CS for both intensity [F(1, 23) = 23.81, P < 0.0001] and valence [F(1, 23) = sixteen.20, P < 0.001] was observed. Different the SCR data, all the same, no main upshot of reinforcer was present for both intensity [F(1, 23) = i.41, P = 0.25] and valence [F(1, 23) = 0.05, P = 0.82]. Consistent with the physiological findings, an interaction was not observed for either intensity [F(i, 23) = 1.06, P = 0.31] or valence [F(one, 23) = 0.91, P = 0.35].

Equally in the previous experiments, the correlation between levels of arousal during gambling (loftier – low incentive trials) and levels of conditioning approached significance for the money conditioning session [r(22) = 0.34, P = 0.10], although information technology was not observed during the stupor conditioning session [r(22) = −0.24, P = 0.26]. Participants with higher levels of arousal during gambling (every bit measured past SCR) likewise rated money CS+ trials higher in terms of valence [r(22) = 0.48, P < 0.05].

Interestingly, the magnitude of physiological responses during the conditioning session with a particular reinforcer (money or shock) was correlated with the subjective ratings of that reinforcer'due south valence, and negatively correlated with the intensity experienced past the opposite reinforcer. That is, participants who showed a greater conditioned response with money as a US also felt worse nearly trials that predicted monetary loss [money CS+ trials: valence correlation, r(22) = 0.48, P < 0.09], and felt that daze CS+ trials were of depression intensity [r(22) = −0.44, P < 0.05]. In contrast, the magnitude of physiological responses during the conditioning session with shock equally a reinforcer was correlated with the subjective ratings of shock valence, and negatively correlated with coin intensity. That is, participants who showed a greater conditioned response with money equally a U.s. felt worse about trials that predicted a potential daze [shock CS+ trials: valence correlation, r(22) = 0.41, P < 0.05] and felt that money CS+ trials were of low intensity [r(22) = −0.41, P < 0.05].

The results of Experiment III support the proffer that a secondary reinforcer such as money tin be an effective unconditioned stimulus during an aversive workout prototype. Furthermore, both physiological and subjective ratings advise that money can be as effective equally a main reinforcer such as shock at driving workout when presented in the appropriate context.

Full general DISCUSSION

The goal of this study was to make up one's mind if money, a secondary reinforcer that acquires its reinforcing properties through social advice and interaction, could influence aversive conditioning, and to compare its efficacy with a master reinforcer, namely shock. In three split up experiments, participants' physiological and subjective responses to a stimulus that predicted a budgetary loss were higher than responses to a non-predictive conditioned stimulus. Furthermore, loss of coin was as effective in driving aversive conditioning as stupor, when the reinforcers were presented in separate aversive workout sessions. Together, these experiments suggest that coin is a powerful incentive that can have similar effects on aversive conditioning as a primary reinforcer when presented in the appropriate context, potentially highlighting the strength of reinforcers learned through association (e.g. money, social rewards) in day to mean solar day behavior.

The role of secondary reinforcers, such as money, in influencing beliefs has been well characterized in lodge. This tin be illustrated by the simple example of going to piece of work, where the incentive of a paycheck or interaction with co-workers is evident. In the laboratory, the influence of money on behavioral, physiological and neural correlates of conditioning has also been observed for appetitive workout tasks (Bechara et al., 1996; Delgado et al., 2004; Zink et al., 2004). In society, however, aversive secondary reinforcers such as losing money can also impact behavior, every bit exemplified by hazard aversion during simple conclusion making (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). The current results extend our understanding of money as a reinforcer for human beliefs by demonstrating that loss of money tin can be used equally an unconditioned stimulus during aversive conditioning paradigms, beingness comparable to shock depending on the presentation context. These findings suggest that coin is a possible mutual metric that can be used to compare appetitive and aversive affective learning.

Although the current results demonstrate that loss of money is every bit effective as shock every bit an unconditioned stimulus in certain circumstances, there was a discrepancy between the subjective and physiological measures of conditioning when comparing the primary and secondary reinforcers. In Experiment 2, in which daze and loss of coin conditioning trails were intermixed, the conditioned response to the CS+ indicating potential stupor was higher than for the CS+ indicating potential loss of money. This difference was not apparent in the subjective ratings of intensity and valence for the two CSs. This suggests a potential differentiation between the implicit conditioned response to a potential negative consequence and the explicit experience attached to it, suggesting the relative intensity of conditioned response acquired with a primary or secondary reinforcer may vary when presented shut in fourth dimension, but merely when assessed implicitly. This discrepancy, however, may not have been observed if subjective ratings were collected at the unmarried trial level like SCR, rather than at the end of the experiment. In addition, this difference may accept occurred because of unbalanced elevations in full general arousal levels. When shock and money unconditioned stimuli were presented in carve up conditioning sessions in Experiment 3, both subjective and physiological measures of the conditioned response were equivalent. Nonetheless, the general arousal levels, equally measured by SCR, were higher during the shock workout session for both the CS+ and the CS−. Since the conditioned response was assessed as the differential SCR to the CS+ and CS−, having a common CS− baseline against which to compare the shock and loss of money CS+ responses in Experiment Ii may accept played a part in the difference observed in the physiological assessment of the conditioned response. These results suggest that the presentation context, the baseline for comparison, and the means of cess may be important factors in understanding the effectiveness of a secondary reinforcer in aversive conditioning. In the appropriate context, loss of coin can influence aversive melancholia learning in a similar fashion as a primary reinforcer.

Every bit a group, the participants demonstrated robust aversive workout when loss of money was the unconditioned stimulus. However, at that place was private variability in the strength of the conditioned response. In all three experiments, participants who were more aroused when gambling for an opportunity to earn coin also showed greater SCRs when presented with a CS that represented a potential monetary loss. The aforementioned participants too felt (as assessed through subjective ratings) that the money trials were either more intense (Experiment Ii) or loss of money was a worse outcome (Experiment Three). This suggests a potential link between 'earning' or working for money and beingness sensitive to signs that mean potential money loss. This information likewise illustrates that the subjective value of money varies and this variability may be related to its effectiveness equally a conditioned reinforcer, every bit expressed both subjectively and physiologically. Information technology would be interesting to examine if this same correlation would be credible with a gambling population that may be insensitive to losses attained during gambling due to discounting (Rachlin, 1990).

In the current study, we specifically examined if the presence of a primary reinforcer altered the effectiveness of the secondary reinforcer in aversive conditioning. Another cistron that may have played a role in the magnitude of this effect that was non examined was the instrumental action, or the human activity of earning the coin, that preceded the aversive workout process. Earlier each conditioning session, participants earned coin through a gambling task to create an endowment for future losses. Information technology is possible this resulted in an endowment effect and heightened loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 2002). Information technology is unclear if participants were merely handed the money at the onset of the study whether the conditioning paradigm would take been every bit effective. In fact, some neuroimaging studies propose that the perception of control regarding the outcome of an action, or 'earning' money through behavior, recruits the neural circuitry of reward-related processes more than robustly than situations where money is just received (Tricomi et al., 2004; Zink et al., 2004). Such discrepancy might exemplify a potential difference betwixt principal and secondary reinforcers. Forth these lines, it might exist interesting to compare primary and secondary reinforcers in an instrumental aversive conditioning paradigm.

Another issue raised by this electric current report is how to properly titrate unlike reinforcers when comparing primary and secondary reinforcers in aversive workout. While the $2.00 coin reinforcer was stock-still throughout participants in our written report, the shock level was set past each participant based on their subjective mensurate of tolerance. Every bit observed in Experiment II, the full general arousal levels were higher during the prediction of a potential stupor. This may not have been apparent if the potential budgetary loss was greater, or the report was conducted in a population that was more sensitive to small-scale losses in coin. Although we were able to find evidence for aversive workout with loss of money as an unconditioned stimulus, a proper comparison between the relative effectiveness of primary and socially defined, secondary reinforcers may exist hard because of the appropriate titration of perceived negative impact and individual differences in the sensitivity to social and cultural reinforcers.

These experiments and other studies that apply coin as a reinforcer as well raise the question of whether coin, due to its societal importance, may not be a typical example of a secondary reinforcer, and may act more than like a chief reinforcer. Peradventure coin, because information technology is an overlearned reinforcer in society, is in a form by itself. It is unclear, for example, how learning through the potential loss of coin is related to other types of secondary reinforcers. How might money compare with unlike types of socially defined secondary reinforcers (e.thousand. pat on the back, compliments) and how such reinforcers collaborate with motivation levels (e.1000. intrinsic × extrinsic)?

In social club to understand potential overlaps or differences between primary and socially defined, secondary reinforcers in aversive conditioning, a comparing of their underlying neural systems would be helpful. If both shock and money are successful in modulating aversive workout then they should both rely in similar neural mechanisms, most notably the amygdala. Yet, studies have shown that the amygdala is involved in processing information well-nigh stimulus intensity (Anderson et al., 2003; Minor et al., 2003), suggesting perchance a possible dissociation betwixt master and secondary reinforcers that is difficult to remedy. In dissimilarity, other brain regions such as the human striatum, involved in updating representations of values during appetitive and aversive learning (Gottfried et al., 2002; Jensen et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; O'Doherty 2004; Seymour et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2005; Knutson and Cooper, 2005), may non differentiate between chief and secondary reinforcers if their result on behavior is similar.

In spite of all the remaining questions for future investigations, the current results clearly demonstrate that coin, a secondary reinforcer and a stimulus that acquires its reinforcing properties through social and cultural means, tin influence aversive workout. Depending on the context of presentation, money tin be equally constructive as a primary reinforcer in driving conditioning, suggesting a socially defined reinforcer'southward properties may exist malleable depending on the situation.

Acknowledgments

The authors would similar to acknowledge Joe LeDoux for useful word and the support of the NIMH (MH62104) and the James S. McDonnell Foundation to EAP.

Footnotes

Conflict of Interest

None declared.

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